We investigate whether consumers are willing to pay for sustainability in seafood purchases. To do this, we estimate a demand model of seafood purchases using a productlevel scanner dataset that includes data both before and after the implementation of an independent, non-profit, third party seafood advisory and sustainability label. The label ratings are based on seafood species, catch method, production method, and country of origin. The label presents sustainability information to consumers through the use of a traffic light label color-based system, where a color rating is assigned and labeled to each fresh seafood stock-keeping unit. Green represents the best choices, yellow represents the "proceed with caution" choices, and red represents the worst choices. Using our panel dataset of individual seafood purchases, we estimate a random utility choice model (RUM) of consumer demand for seafood products. Each seafood product is defined as a bundle of attributes, including price, species, gear type, environmental contaminant advisory information, and sustainability rating color. Model identification comes from the partial and random implementation of the label system across the retail chain. Empirical results suggest that consumers perceive seafood as a differentiated product category with respect to sustainability labels. A second stage GLS regression of product characteristics on the RUM product fixed effects point estimates indicate that consumers prefer selective harvest methods, wild caught seafood, and U.S. caught seafood.
Introduction
Commercial fisheries operate in a globally competitive marketplace characterized by factors including differential levels of both customer conservation concerns and regulatory oversight across species groups and management bodies (Smith, et. al, 2010; Costello, et. al., 2008; Watson and Pauly, 2001; Delgado, et. al., 2003) . Environmental sustainability labels, or eco-labels, are one tool that commercial fishers employ to increase economic viability through product differentiation in terms of sustainability.
Existing empirical research has illustrated that seafood eco-labels are associated with shifts in market demand from moderate to more sustainable choices (Roheim et al, 2011; Teisl et al 2002; Hallstein and Villas-Boas, 2011) , demonstrating that consumer-focused mechanisms, such as eco-labels and certification, have market impacts and are a tool to be considered in fisheries management.
Existing research on consumer-focused mechanisms, like eco-labels, rely largely on attitudinal and knowledge surveys, consumer choice experiments, and experimental auctions (see e.g., Alfnes, et. al., 2006; Johnston and Roheim, 2006; Johnston et. al., 2001; Wessels, 2002; Wessels et. al., 1999) . While these studies offer valuable insight and methodological approaches, one potential weakness is that they capture consumers' stated preferences and not actual behaviors. There can be wide disparities between consumers' stated preferences and their actual purchases (Hensher and Bradley, 1993) .
In the revealed preference literature, hedonic price models (Asche and Guillen, 2012; Roheim et. al., 2011; Roheim et. al., 2007; Jaffry et. al., 2004; Carroll et. al., 2001; McConnell and Strand, 2000) , demand system (Teisl et. al., 2002) and case study (Roheim, 2003) approaches have been used to estimate relative values for seafood product attributes such as catch method, fishing gear choice, country of origin, product color (of salmon), and environmental sustainability. The articles most relevant to our paper are Roheim et al. (2011 ), Teisl et al. (2002 , and Hallstein and Villas-Boas (2013) . ‡ Roheim et al. (2011) apply an hedonic price function approach to scanner data on the sale responses to the sustainability label system studied in this paper. They surprisingly find that sales of yellow-rated labeled products decreased significantly in treatment stores relative to controls, while red-and green-rated labeled products saw no change in the quantity sold. We expand on the reduced-form evidence presented in Hallerstein and Villas-Boas (2013) , and utilize the same primary data to estimate a structural utility theoretic consistent revealed-preference consumer choice model.
The availability of information about a product does not necessarily mean consumers will incorporate it into their decisions and alter their behavior.
§ Our study expands upon these efforts by not only directly testing whether consumers directly incorporate the available information, but also exploiting the quasi-experimental nature of our research design to estimate whether consumers' implied sensitivities towards price and preferences for product attributes change with increased product label information.
Our contribution is to develop and estimate a structural model of seafood demand.
That is, we analyze actual consumer retail supermarket shopping behavior for seafood products sold at the seafood counter of a coastal California supermarket chain to directly estimate the revealed preferences and corresponding willingness to pay measures for color-rating that proxy for sustainability characteristics. In so doing, we will provide resource managers and policy makers with important information on the efficacy of ecolabels as well as a barometer reading on consumer preferences.
Using supermarket scanner data on seafood purchases, we estimate a demand model of consumer preferences for seafood products, where consumers' willingness to pay measures for sustainability characteristics of seafood are calculated by taking advantage of a phased roll-out of an environmental sustainability label system for seafood
As!shown!in!a!variety!of!settings,!consumers!do!not!always!incorporate!all!available!information! (Ippolito!and!Mathios,!1995; !Mathios,!2000) . !Teisl!et!al.!(2002) !is!one!of!the!few!studies!on!the! seafood!industry!using!consumer!purchase!data!to!confirm!that!the!dolphinCsafe!tuna!label!increased! the!market!share!of!canned!tuna.!More!recently,! Shimschack!et!al.!(2007 )!and!Teisl!et!al.!(2012 ,! investigate!the!impact!of!seafood!risk!advisories!for!certain!population!groups.! ! ! counter products. We define a product as a bundle of attributes such as product type, country of origin, and label score. The label score is communicated by means of a traffic light color rating assigned to a label on each fresh seafood stock-keeping unit (SKU).
The labeling program informs consumers about the relative environmental sustainability of each seafood product based on the seafood species, catch method, production method, and country or state of origin by an independent non-profit organization. The label utilizes three color-based scores: Green, 'best choice,' means that the product is considered to be from a sustainable fishery. Yellow, `proceed with caution,' means that wild fish populations are healthy; however, other problems exist such as poor fisheries management. Red, 'worst choice,' means that the wild fish populations are overfished and that the fishery may be characterized by other problems, such as habitat destruction. The supermarket chain randomly chose two of its stores in which to test posting the label advisory before rolling it out to all stores, creating a quasi experimental empirical setup of two treatment and eight control stores. As the pricing is common across all stores for each time period, prices are uncorrelated with label system treatment. As the data set does not contain observations for the entire year, we do not directly model seasonality;
however the treatment-control approach controls for any seasonal variation effects without our data.
Prior to the introduction of the sustainability labels, consumers observed species, price, country of origin, and catch method when making seafood choices. Using a multistore, multi-product level panel scanner data set for individual purchases, we estimate a RUM model of consumer demand for seafood using a logit approach to estimate consumer preferences for the implemented seafood sustainability-rating labels, as well as for the product attributes observed by consumers. Using the fitted demand model estimates, we then estimate the marginal average willingness to pay for seafood receiving each sustainability-rating label designation as the ratio of the marginal utility of each sustainability-rating label designation relative to the marginal utility of price. Finally, we conduct a posterior analysis regressing product fixed effects values on time invariant characteristics including harvest methods and country of origin.
Our findings suggest that consumers find the addition of a yellow diminished from the value of the product, whereas there is not significant value associated with the ! ! application of red or green-labels on products. Moreover, consumers would need to be offered an average discount of 3.56 dollars per pound to purchase a product labeled with a yellow rating. Given the pre-labeling-period average product price of 11 dollars per pound, the percentage price discount needed to get people to continue buying the yellowlabeled alternatives is estimated to be roughly a third. In addition we find that, on average, consumers, prefer the use of selective harvest methods from wild fisheries, prefer wild caught seafood relative to farmed, and prefer seafood originating in the U.S.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical setting and the data, section 3 presents the model used, section 4 discusses the main results, and section 5 concludes.
Experimental setting and data
This study uses point-of-sale scanner data from a regional upscale US The pilot-labeling program consisted of deploying a product-specific sustainability label, where the sustainability rating was assigned a "traffic light color." In addition to the sustainability-rating label deployed within pilot stores during the treatment period, each seafood product offered at the seafood counter by the chain across all stores and time periods were also labeled with the product species, the country or state of origin, the catch method, and the price per pound. Thus, an example of a typical label across all stores during all time periods would inform the consumer that the product is Petrale Sole, was caught in the United States (U.S.) using a bottom trawl, and the price is $16.99 per pound. Labeling for seafood products in pilot stores during the treatment period would include additional proprietary color-coded environmental sustainability rating, such as a to inform consumers about seafood sustainability. We do not have information about which consumers shopping at the Retailer also utilized other sources of information. We discuss the potential impact that the baseline of treatment and control store consumer sustainability knowledge from other sources could have on our estimates in our interpretation of results and our robustness checks.
The analysis for this study uses several unique data sets. From the Retailer, we obtained scanner panel data for the weeks before and after the labeling roll out. This data contained the following fields: date, store, unique product number, general seafood type (e.g. salmon), product name (e.g. King Salmon fillet), unit sales, dollar sales, full retail price per unit, discounted price per unit, wholesale cost per unit, gross margin, and country of origin (N=7841). Second, the eco-label firm provided quarterly reports with which a weekly record of the assignment of (1) color-ratings by product, (2) individual variables that contributed to the color-rating label: country of origin, catch method, and production method, and (3) contaminant levels for Mercury and Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs). Third, in order to control for differences in consumer sociodemographic characteristics between stores, zip code level socio-demographic data from the United States Census Bureau was compiled for all store zip codes. The above datasets were merged for the empirical analysis.
! !
The Retailer did not adjust pricing and promotional activity in response to the color-rating labels during the weeks immediately before and after implementation of the labeling program. That is, marketing-mix practices such as pricing and promotions are initially exogenous to the label color-rating. In the longer term, the Retailer may have altered its marketing mix practices and prices as a response to demand for the labels and color-ratings. In this analysis, we use variation in product wholesale cost as an instrument for observed retail price to estimate demand responses.
For the empirical analysis the data are aggregated at the weekly store level. If a product is not sold at any store in the data set during a particular week, that product is absent from the data. The data contain 3,899 product store-week level observations for the pre-labeling period and 3,942 for the post-labeling period. Table 1 reports that salmon, halibut, and sole in that order, are the top three types of seafood by revenue.
! ! Summary statistics of the scanner quantity and price data stratified by the pre-labeling and post-labeling periods are reported in Table 2 . We find that there is no statistically significant difference between the pre-and post-labeling periods for the natural logarithm of the quantity of units sold or average price per pound. 
In Table 3 we see first that the proportion of sales by weight, for each sustainability color-rating, varies by treatment and control stores over the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods. Comparisons between the treatment and control stores in the pre-treatment show that sales by weight in the treatment store are characterized by the treatment store selling more "green" products, and fewer "yellow" and "red" products.
During the post-treatment period the treatment store is characterized as selling more "red" products, fewer "yellow" products, and roughly equivalent shares of "green"
products.
There is no statistically significant difference in the number of seafood product choices for an average week and store in the pre-treatment and treatment periods. At the average treatment store during the pre-treatment period, customers could choose between 33 different fresh seafood products during an average week. If these products had been labeled using the FishWise Advisory, 13 of the products would have been green, 9 of them would have been yellow and 11 of them would have been red. At the average control store during the pre-treatment period, customers could choose between 32 different fresh seafood products during an average week. If these products had been ! ! labeled using the FishWise Advisory, 11 of them would have been green, 10 of them would have been yellow and 11 of them would have been red. There is some evidence that the number of red products decreased in both treatment and control stores during the treatment period (11 to 9 products in the treatment stores and 11 to 10 products in the control stores). Otherwise, the number of product choices was similar between pretreatment and treatment periods.
There is no statistically significant difference in product characteristics for an average store in the pre-treatment and treatment periods during an average week. At the average treatment store during the pre-treatment period, 56.7% of the products would have been listed on the low-mercury list if the FishWise Advisory had been in place, 30.4% of products were on sale, 52.2% of products were wild (versus farmed) and 36.6%
of products were caught in the United States during an average week. These numbers are 
Model
In our analysis on the impact of information on consumer choice, we define product-specific information provision via labels as an additional or differentiated product attribute. Recognizing that consumer products can be defined as a bundle of perceived product attributes provide the framework to compute consumers' willingness to pay for additional labeling information in a straightforward way. The utilized discrete choice model (e.g. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995; McFadden and Train, 2000; Nevo, 2000; Nevo, 2003; Swait et al., 2004 ) also offers flexibility in incorporating consumer heterogeneity with regard to seafood characteristics such as environmental sustainability, environmental contaminates, and origin.
We model consumer choice with a random utility model framework logit; parameters are estimated with random coefficients to allow for consumer heterogeneity.
Directly modeling heterogeneous consumer preferences with the estimation of random coefficients allows a functional form that is very flexible in terms of estimated substitution patterns. This modeling approach combined with the unique quasiexperimental setting and resulting data variation for seafood purchases allows us to estimate consumers' valuation for environmental seafood sustainability (McFadden, 1974; Train, 2002) .
Starting from a random utility framework where both the product attributes as well as a random term are assumed to enter linearly, the utility from consuming a certain seafood product j at time t can be described as
where the matrix X jt contains the attributes of the seafood product, L jt =1 after the labeling implementation for the labeled products (and equal to zero otherwise), the vector β represents the marginal utility placed on each of the X attributes, γ is the marginal utility with respect to the label, and ξ j are unobserved (to the researcher) determinants of utility but observed by consumers, and ε jt denotes remaining unobserved determinants of utility, where we assume that ε jit is iid type I extreme value distributed.
! !
Assuming that consumers purchase one unit of product j among all the possible products available at a certain time t that maximizes their indirect utility, then the market share of product j during week t is given by the probability that good j is chosen, that is,
We estimate demand parameters, following Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995) , by equating the estimated product market shares given by (2) to the observed shares, and solving for the mean utility across all consumers, defined as
Since prices are not randomly assigned, we use changes in wholesale prices over time to instrument for retail prices. First, the price decision takes into account cost side variables, such as wholesale cost prices. While wholesale prices are correlated with observed product characteristics such as country of origin, specific species, and gear type, it is reasonable to assume that wholesale prices are uncorrelated with changes in unobserved product characteristics, ξ jt , such as changes in shelf display.
The logit model is estimated using Berry's (1994) approach to linearize the choice model equation to estimate. Given the predicted market shares or probabilities equal to
and given that the mean utility of not buying any alternative, that we define as the outside option good j=0, is normalized to 0, then
Taking the natural logarithm of the probability in (4) and subtracting the log of the probability of not buying (5) yields
It follows that estimation logit model is obtained by regressing the dependent variable that is the log of each product's observed market share minus the log of the market share ! ! of not purchasing on the variables entering the mean utility, such as price, labels and product attributes.
Secondary to the primary analysis, we conduct a posterior analysis on the estimated product-store fixed effects from the logit analysis (6). As demonstrated by Pagan (1984) , the reliability of drawing such inferences with a simple 2-step OLS based model may be questioned as the OLS estimator of standard errors may be inconsistent in the general case. Following Hoffman (1987) , we employ a 2-step approach utilizing generalized least squares in the second step to regress the generated product-store fixed effects on several time invariant product characteristics.
Estimation results for the logit (6) and posterior GLS (7) analyses are presented in the following section.
Results
Parameter estimates for the logit discrete choice demand model of the probability of purchasing a particular seafood product at a store in a week as a function of seafood products attributes, as given by equation (6), are reported in Table 4 .
! ! Product attributes consist of (i) time invariant product-store determinants of demand captured by a product-store fixed effect, and (ii) time changing attributes such as price and the implementation of posting the eco labels. Table 4 reports the parameter estimates for 5 specifications of the model. The dependent variable for all columns is the log of the market share of each product minus the log of the market share of not buying. Seafood receiving a yellow rating is the base category or reference group. In column (1) we present the OLS model results, in column (2) we add product by store fixed effects, while in column (3) we add week fixed effects in addition to (2). Column (4) adds price as an additional control to the specification in column (1) and then column (5) adds price as a control to the specification in column (3).
! !
Starting with columns (1) and (4), the green and red point estimates, respectively, suggest that consumers prefer green products relative to yellow products and they dislike red products relative to yellow products. When we include product by store fixed effects in columns (2), (3), and (5), we no longer have the color type average marginal utility estimates as in columns (1) and (4). We note that the positive sign on the price parameter in column (4) indicates there to be omitted variables that consumers and firms take into account when making choices that are positively correlated with price and choices (or marginal utilities). This bias makes the price sensitivity of demand estimated using a simple OLS specification be biased towards zero and not negative. Once we control for week and product by store fixed effects, capturing omitted determinants of marginal utility that change from week to week and also that are constant on average for each product, then the price coefficient becomes of the correct negative sign and statistically significant at the 10% level, column (5). ! During the experiment period (interpreted as a simple pre-treatment and posttreatment period change), red and green product sales did not significantly change as can be seen in the rows labeled "Red*Treatment Time" and "Green*Treatment time", respectively, across all specifications. However, sales of yellow rated products dropped significantly as can be seen for all specifications in the row "Yellow*Treatment Time".
Looking now at the difference-in-difference point estimates associated with the interactions of the rating color and "Treatment Time*Treated Store," we can read the changes of quantity sold for products in treated stores relative to the contemporaneous changes in the same products in the control stores. The effect is broken up by the color of the label implemented. In column (1) we see that the OLS estimates imply that receiving sustainability labels of "red" and "green" significantly increase the quantity sold of those respective products; however, products that receive sustainability labels of "yellow" had no significant effect on sales. This specification must be interpreted with caution, as we are not controlling for the fact that there could be differences in the determinants of quantity sold for the different products that could be biasing the results. In fact, when we control for product-store constant determinants of quantity, we see that yellow labeled products do decrease due to the labeling implementation and there is no significant impact on red and green products (Column 2). When we consider additional controls for ! ! weekly level determinants of quantity, the results are robust and show the only statistically significant result of this label experiment to be that yellow-labeled products experienced a drop in sales by a significant 31 to 32% (Column 3). The results of the yellow significant negative effect are also robust to the inclusion of controls for products' prices (Column 5). Moreover, in column (4) we see that the price coefficient suffers for the usual omitted variable bias of the OLS, and after we control for product-by store and weekly effects in column (5) the price coefficient has a significant and negative point estimate.
Willingness to pay estimates can be calculated using the estimated coefficients in Table 3 , Column (5). For example, the WTP for yellow labels is computed by taking the ratio of the marginal utility of a yellow treatment label of -0.314 by the absolute value of the marginal utility of price that is equal to -0.088. This ratio suggests that consumers find products receiving a yellow label as not preferable and would need to be offered an average discount of 3.56 dollars per pound (-0.314/0.08) to purchase a product labeled with a yellow rating. Given the pre-labeling-period average product price of 11 dollars per pound, the estimated price discount needed to get people to continue buying the yellow labeled alternatives is roughly a third. Table 5 reports the estimation results for the generalized least squares (GLS)
specification (Equation 7). The specification projects the estimated product-store fixed effects from the specification in Column 5 of Table 4 In the first column of Table 5 we control for time invariant product characteristics. In column (2), we additionally control for store fixed effects. In column (3), we control for species group using species fixed effects as well. In column (4), we substitute harvest method fixed effects for species fixed effects. In column (5), we substitute country of origin fixed effects for species fixed effects. In column (3), the species groups we control for are coastal pelagic species, highly migratory species, snapper, bass, freshwater species, groundfish, halibut, salmon, shellfish and other crustaceans, a multi-species seafood salad category, and a residual "other" category for all other seafood counter products. In column (4), the harvest methods we control for are purse seine, gillnet, traps, handline/pole/troll, longline, trawl, farmed, and a category for mussels and wild salmon. In column (5), we control for 10 countries and an exempt from disclosure category.
Due to collinearity with the product specific fixed effects, the parameter estimates for some of the primary time invariant product characteristics vary by model. Specifically, the parameter estimate for "selective gear" is not statistically significant, and "wild caught" is omitted from column (4) due to the inclusion of catch method fixed effects.
Similarly, the parameter estimate for "US" is not statistically significant in column (5) due to the inclusion of 10 additional origin fixed effects. In this case, we argue what is of importance is the preference towards US products over the set of all other aggregate products.
Empirical results from the posterior GLS estimation suggests that, on average, consumers prefer the use of selective harvest methods over wild fisheries, wild caught seafood over farmed, and seafood originating in the U.S. over internationally-sourced seafood. The coefficient on low-mercury products is not significantly different from zero for all specifications. These results are robust across all specifications, apart from column 4 for which we expect that the gear type fixed effect is collinear with the both the selective harvest method and wild caught binary variables.
Conclusions
This paper provides the first detailed empirical analysis concerning the impact of point-of-sale labeling changes on purchase patterns between seafood products. We empirically investigate consumer responses to one such seafood "traffic light" eco-label system implemented at a coastal California supermarket chain.
Through marketplace signals, eco-labels are purported to economically reward successful stewardship. In theory, eco-labels provide consumers easy-to-use relativerating information, allowing the differentiation of products on the basis of a complex set of attributes that are beyond the general knowledge of consumers. From the commercial fishery operation's perspective, the utility of eco-labels is their ability to allow the differentiation of products along environmental and sustainable attributes that may allow the passing of costs associated with best-practices onto consumers who value sustainability.
Our findings inform fishery participants, managers, retailers, and consumers of the expected price premium and demand shift impacts of seafood labels, and have implications for the current debate regarding sustainability labels as a tool in coastal and marine resource conservation and management. Through the testing of the presence and scale of an effect, the research provides information on the estimated benefits of the eco-! ! label tool, and highlights the concomitant risk of placing too much confidence in the efficacy of eco-labels to alter consumer behavior and demand for seafood.
Based on modeling actual seafood purchase records, we find consumers reveal preferences that are generally consistent with placing a positive value on sustainability.
Evidence from the posterior GLS analysis suggests positive and significant consumer willingness-to-pay for seafood characterized as being caught by selective gear, wildcaught, and of US origin.
Evidence on consumer willingness-to-pay for sustainability, as measured by the implementation of the eco-label, is more nuanced. When consumers are provided additional information on the sustainability rating via a "traffic-light" based product rating system, the consumers do not switch to the better alternatives within those rankings. Neither do we see consumers significantly switching away from the worst ranked products. However, we do find that when provided with the eco-label consumers would need to receive a discount of roughly 1/3 to purchase products receiving a Yellow, `proceed with caution,' score.
One possible explanation of the empirical finding of a negative and significant treatment parameter estimate for yellow-rated seafood is that the aggregate pre-label perception of consumers is that the seafood is relatively more sustainable than it is as measured by the third-party rating agency; and in the light of the provision of sustainability information via the sustainability-ratings labels consumers selected to reduce purchases of yellow-rated seafood that they had previously believed to be of a high level of sustainability. Although the interpretation of the result should be tested through further study, the possible interpretation illustrates a possible behavioral consumer response in which consumers value attributes associated with sustainability.
And while consumers may have already acquired information on seafood sustainability regarding "red" and "green" products through other information channels, the eco-label program provides new information to consumers with which they, in aggregate, alter their actual purchases. The differentiated nature of the consumers that shop at the high-end retailer should be considered in the context of hypothesis.
These findings provide mixed information to the fishing industry and dependent communities regarding the willingness of individual consumers to pay a price premium ! ! for sustainably caught seafood and the impact of the implantation of the eco-label program. Within our sample of data, we find evidence that in general consumers value
sustainability, yet we reject that the labels have a significant positive label efficacy. Thus our findings may, taken as given, not encourage businesses to adopt additional programs that disseminate product sustainability attributes. Results suggest that sustainability labels have the short-run affect of steering consumers away from seafood (yellow ratings) that do not meet the standards of a "best choice" (green), and consumers are currently not purchasing the "best choice" alternative due to a mix of price and tastes. It is possible that consumer behavior may change over the long-run as new product markets mature with consumer demand.
Researchers and practitioners have considerable work ahead of them in order to a)
better understand the impact of confounding factors on eco-labeling, environmental contaminates, and origin labeling efficacy, b) understand consumer perceptions and understanding of product labeling programs, and c) design more effective, uniform and standardized product labeling programs. In all three areas, it is crucial that conservation and management professionals understand the expected strengths and weaknesses of product labeling programs. Poorly designed labeling programs may have the potential to shift consumer purchase patterns with negative consequences, reducing consumer and producer welfare and reducing overall fishery sustainability.
